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1. Introduction  
According to the latest UNAIDS estimation (2008), about 33.2 million people are living with HIV/AIDS 
in the world in 2007, mostly in developing countries. More than 2.5 million people were newly infected 
this year and 2.1 million people died of AIDS. Due to prevention programme and changes in 
behaviour, the epidemic seems to peak in the 90s. Yet, the Sub-Saharan region still bears the largest 
burden with 22 million people infected. Zimbabwe, Namibia, South-Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and Zambia are particularly hit by the epidemic where between 15 and 26% of adults are 
infected by HIV/AIDS. Beside, due to the demographic factor, more and more people are infected and 
prevalence rate are growing in East and South-East Asia. Today, 4.9 million people live with HIV/AIDS 
in this region, especially in India and China. Concerning Latin America, 1.7 million adults and children 
are infected.  
Whether no vaccine exists to cure the infection, about a score antiretrovirals (ARVs) treats the 
infection and enables people to live with the infection. Among the first drugs available, AZT was used 
to treat the infection and prevent the transmission from mother to child during the delivery. Since the 
80s, many treatments were developed to treat HIV/AIDS. Significant improvements have been made 
since the single therapies developed in the late 80s to the multi-therapies recently developed to 
overcome the occurrence of resistance to treatments. Nowadays, patients benefit from single, bi and 
tri-therapies, suffer less from resistances and improve the quality of their everyday life.  
Accordingly, the access to ARVs has become crucial in developing countries where the epidemic 
causes dramatic socio-economic impacts as estimate the micro and macro-studies released on 
households and economic growth (Over, 1992, Ainsworth, 1993, Bonnel, 2000, Dixon & alii, 2001, 
Drouin & al., 2003). On the whole, the HIV/AIDS epidemic reminds that the accessibility issue is not 
new in developing countries. Since the 1970s, the World Health Organization (WHO) has been 
working for the “right of all to health” by essentially increasing the access to essential drugs for people 
in poor countries. In this perspective, the first list of essential drugs was laid down in 1977. The list 
elected the least expensive products that could cure the most predominant diseases in developing 
countries. Since then, drug is defined as a specific and essential good, which had to be made 
accessible for the greatest number at a reasonable price. To specifically achieve the accessibility to 
medicines for patients infected by HIV/AIDS in developing countries, the WHO and the United Nations 
for AIDS (UNAIDS) have launched the “3 by 5” initiative in 2003. The goal is to provide ARVs to three 
million infected people in low and middle-income countries by the end of 2005. It is a step towards the 
larger goal of ensuring universal access of HIV/AIDS treatments for all who need them as a human 
right in poor countries where national health coverage are definitely lacking.  
For that reason, the WHO issues and revises comprehensive guidelines for a public health approach 
of ARVs procurements in countries where resources are limited (WHO, 2006). Concretely, in those 
guidelines, every public health authorities can find information about when beginning an anti-AIDS 
treatment, which first line regimen may be the more suitable for adolescents, adults or pregnant 
women regarding mainly the potency of all therapies, their side effects and their prices. WHO indicates 
also when patients must switch to another therapy because of resistance to a first line regimen or 
intolerable side effects. Tri-therapies are highly recommended since drug resistances are notably 
reduced.  
Yet, the access to medicines in developing countries hit by dramatic epidemics such as HIV/AIDS 
actually questions the patent status of these life-saving drugs. Therefore, the recent evolutions of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) regimes in the world matter. Accordingly, the paper intends to 
discuss the influence of IPRs evolution on drug accessibility in developing countries. Precisely, 
building on a review of the two main sources of IPRs evolution in the world, i.e. Trade Related aspects 
of Intellectual Property rights (TRIPs) agreement and the USA Free-Trade Agreements (FTAs), the 
paper indicates how international agreements may seriously undermine accessibility and affordability 
in developing countries. The argument stresses on the fact that many provisions may help to extend 
market exclusivity holds by firms, prevent the competition of generic makers and at last defer the 
launch of more affordable medicines in developing countries.  
The objective, principles and flexibilities of the TRIPs agreement will be first presented (§2). Beyond 
the obligation to settle a strong IPRs regime, concerns about public health are expressed and 
flexibilities are provided for circumstances where drug accessibility is crucial, especially in developing 
countries. Then, the content of some USA FTAs will be examined. In particular, the provisions devoted 
to patent extension and generic competition prevention will be listed as means that may roughly 
damage drug accessibility. Finally, some evidence concerning the link between IPRs regime, 
competition and drug accessibility will be reminded. Building on Indian case studies, elements about 
the drastic decrease of ARVs prices due to the generic competition will be related. Besides, 
impediments to the supply of affordable ARVs in Thailand will be described.  
2. The strengthening of IPRs regimes: from TRIPs ag reement to Doha ministerial declaration 
Since decades, IPRs regimes have been reinforced in the world. Mostly, ratified in 1994, the TRIPs 
agreement is progressively implemented in developing countries, members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). In the pharmaceutical sector, this agreement sets up a strong IPRs regime by 
providing patents for both process and product, extending the duration of patent to 20 years at least 
and its geographical coverage to all members of the WTO, including developing countries (Nogues, 
1990, Desterbecq & Remiche, 1996, Abbott, 1996, Boulet & Velasquez, 1999, Correa, 2000). 
Accordingly, national patent laws must be amended to be compliant with TRIPs provisions.  
2.1. TRIPs agreement: objectives and principles 
In the early 1980s, arguing that regulatory delays reduced the effective life of patents, the US 
pharmaceutical industry began to plead for the extension of the patent term. In 1984, the USA 
acceded to the request of the pharmaceutical industry by increasing patent duration to 20 years after 
filing for a patent1. Europe initiated a similar trend a few years later, following the French example. In 
1990, France instituted the Certificat Complémentaire de Protection (complementary protection 
certificate), which extended the patent duration by 5 years at the most. In 1992, Europe adopted 
likewise the Certificat Communautaire (EC certificate), extending the duration of patents by maximum 
5 years (Mfuka, 2002).  
Besides, an increasing number of studies underlined the prejudices that the pharmaceutical industry 
seemed to bear. The attention was focused on the increasing costs of R&D programmes. Millions of 
dollars were required to take a drug from the research on the therapeutic qualities of a molecule up to 
its launch on the market (Grabowsky, 1982, DiMasi & alii, 1991, Goozner, 2005). Developing countries 
were so under pressure from developed countries. For instance, India was accused of piracy, which 
prejudices multinationals’ profits and endangers the development of new drugs2. Developed countries 
intervened through forums that governed international trade to push developing countries to reinforce 
patent protection. Yet, India and Brazil were fighting to avoid negotiation about IPRs during the 
Uruguay Round. Unfortunately, in 1986, the Member States agreed to launch a negotiation 
programme on several trade policy issues, including trade in services and IPRs.  
The Uruguay Round lasted 8 years and ended in April 1994 with the establishment of the WTO and 
the ratification of the TRIPs agreement in Marrakech. Any member (or country who wishes to join the 
WTO) must submit to its rules and observe the content of this agreement. Otherwise, contraveners 
may be subject to trade sanctions.  
The WTO primarily lays down that the objective  of the TRIPs agreement is to implement international 
minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property (Velasquez & Boulet, 1999, Raizada & 
                                                
1 Or 14 years after obtaining marketing approval.  
2 The accusation was fallacious, since these were, in reality, legal activities allowed by a weak IPRs sy tem under which for 
instance patents were provided only for process.  
Sayed, 2002). Thus, the agreement does not set-up a single and universal IPRs system: members 
have to respect these minimum standards through the ways and means they choose and they are free 
to adopt a more stringent regime than the one required by the TRIPs agreement (Article 1).  
Further, there is no “absolute and unique obligation” in this objective (Velasquez & Boulet, 1997). On 
the contrary, WTO acknowledges the need for members to meet objectives regarding development 
and public health. Accordingly, the protection of patents has to fall within a national space in which 
governments are responsible for meeting these objectives. Thus, patent protection “should contribute 
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare, and to ensure a balance of rights and obligations” (Article 7).  
It follows that members can legislate in respect of principles  such as the promotion of “public health, 
(...), and public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development” (Article 8-1). Similarly, they can exercise “appropriate measures” to “prevent the abuse 
of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain 
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.” (Article 8-2). The TRIPs agreement 
is therefore not merely governed by an unconditional protection of IPRs.  
Article 27 prescribes what is patentable  and what is not. It states that “patents shall be available for 
any inventions, whether products or processes in all fields of technology” (Article 27-1). Henceforth, it 
is no longer possible for a country to exclude products or specific industrial fields from patentability. 
Further, patentability criteria are fixed: products or processes must be “new, involve an inventive 
phase and can be used for industrial application”. Besides, criteria for patentability exclusion are 
defined such as the protection of “public order or morality” and “serious prejudice to the environment” 
(Article 27-2). Finally, “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or 
animals” are not patentable (Article 27-3).  
In addition, process and product patents will be valid for at least 20 years, beginning with the date on 
which the application was first filed (Article 33). The patent holder obtains a monopoly over the use of 
his (or her) innovation for a period of 20 years. Concretely, drugs discovered and patented after 1995 
can be patented in WTO’s Members States. In case of a dispute, the onus is not on the patent holder 
to prove the validity of his (or her) patent (Article 34). The “copier” would have to bring in such a proof.  
Article 27 forbids members from resorting to discrimination in the issue and use of a patent by its 
holder. In respect of the National treatment principle (Article 3), the use of a patent shall be possible 
“whether products are imported or locally produced”. The notion of “working patent”  widely adopted 
in developing countries is therefore weaken in the TRIPs agreement. For instance, the Indian patent 
law prescribed till recently that local production could only validate the effective use of a patent, and 
patent holders were thus required within three years to exercise their rights through an effective local 
production. Otherwise, patents could be revoked (Guennif, 2004).  
As TRIPs agreement intends to implement an adequate protection of IPRs that fits with the public 
health priorities of developing countries and the dissemination of innovation in the world, they provide 
flexibilities. Patents may be circumvented in particular circumstances.  
2. 2. Flexibilities provided by the TRIPs agreement   
First of all, whereas developed countries have implemented TRIPs agreement since 1995, a 
transitional period  is granted to developing countries (and eastern countries undergoing a 
transformation towards free-market economy) (Article 65). Later, the transitional period has been fixed 
to 2005 for developing countries such as India, China and 2015 to least developed countries. 
However, this transitional period can be extended “in view of the special needs and requirements” and 
merely “their need for flexibility to create a viable technological base” (Article 66-1). Accordingly, for 
instance African countries will have to cope with TRIPs requirements at last in 2015 if the transitional 
period is not extended3.  
In accordance with the principles of the TRIPs agreement, a country may override patents in order to 
promote public health objectives, such as access to medicines. “In the case of a national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use” (Article 31b) or 
                                                
3 In detail, the transitional period is not that favourable since it concerns developing countries where till 1994 no patent law 
provided patent for product and process in the pharmaceutical sector. In other words, as part before 1994 of an international 
agreement under which patents are acknowledged for process and product, a country may suffer from a shorter transitional 
period.  
“to remedy a practice determined to be anti-competitive” (Article 31k), a country may use the rights 
conferred by the patent, without any authorisation from the holder. But the patent holder may be 
informed of the country’s intention to use these rights within a reasonable time frame and may be 
adequately compensated. Consequently, in the event of an HIV/AIDS, malaria or even tuberculosis 
epidemic, or/and given the prohibitive prices or inadequate quantities provided, a country can issue a 
compulsory licence  (CL). There would be no need to try and seek a voluntary license (the voluntary 
transfer of rights against royalties negotiated between actors). A CL can be used by a public 
organisation or a private firm. A country may authorise a government agency or a private firm to 
produce a drug to deal with a national emergency and supply the generic version of a medicine 
available finally at lower price and/or greater quantity. The agreement acknowledges also that States 
have full discretion to define what a national emergency is.  
According to the TRIPs agreement, a patent owner has the right to manufacture, use, offer for sale, 
sell or import his (or her) product (Article 28a). He (or she) also has the right to transfer these rights 
through licensing contracts (Article 28b). The right to import is governed by the principle of rights 
exhaustion under which a patent holder may lose or exhaust certain rights. The principle covers three 
scenarios:  
- First, national exhaustion entails the limitation of the right of goods circulation in a country. If 
the patent owner accepts the marketing of his (or her) product in a country, national 
exhaustion forbids any export of the product to another country.  
- Second, regional exhaustion calls for the limitation of the right of circulation of the product in a 
region. If the patent owner agrees to market his (or her) product for example in the European 
Union (EU), regional exhaustion would limit the product’s circulation within the EU. Export of a 
product from one member country to another member country would be lawful. On the other 
hand, exports from a member-country to a country outside the EU would be prohibited.  
- Third, international exhaustion does not call for any limitation on the flow of the product. Once 
the patent owner has accepted that his (or her) product be marketed in a country, international 
exhaustion authorises its export to any other country.  
In case of international exhaustion, parallel import  (PI) is so lawful. A country “A” can purchase a 
drug from a country “B” if the price of the drug is lower in that country. Precisely, if the suitable 
principle is adopted in the two countries to permit PI in country “A” and parallel export in country “B”. In 
case of regional exhaustion, countries “A” and “B” must belong to the same region: the EU, the African 
Regional Industrial Property Organization (ARIPO) for East Africa, the African Intellectual Property 
Organisation (AIPO) for West Africa, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and so on. Also, the principle of PI is a regulatory 
measure that makes it possible to fight against anti-competitive and discriminatory practices, 
extensively condemned by the WTO, for restoring competition, especially when the prices are deemed 
prohibitive and/or the quantities available are determined to be inadequate.  
The TRIPs agreement does not give any prescription concerning the principle that members may 
choose: “nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights” (Article 6). Members have free scope to specify the principle of exhaustion that they 
wish to adopt in order to fight against anti-competitive practices and promote public health. There are 
animated debates about the principle members should adopt. On the one hand, international 
exhaustion is viewed as a mean that may enable members to fight against anti-competitive practices 
and facilitate people’s access to treatments by proceeding with PI. On the other hand, it may be feared 
that international exhaustion may induce firms to opt for a single price strategy for fighting against PI. 
In this way, firms prevent undesirable parallel exports from countries where a product is marketed at 
low price to countries where the product is marketed this time at higher price. Rationally, this single 
price would be close to the one prevailing in developed countries, whence an upward revision for 
developing countries. Finally, some recommend national exhaustion.  
At the end, the TRIPs agreement stipulates a number of things: patents can be provided for products 
and processes for at least 20. However, several points remain vague, left to the discretion of 
members: the definition of a national emergency or the principle of rights exhaustion adopted for 
instance.  
2.3. The Doha declaration: public health must preva il over IPRs  
Given the difficulties and pressures encountered by developing countries in making effective use of 
flexibilities provided by the TRIPs agreement, due for a part to the imprecision and ambiguity 
surrounding some provisions, members reaffirmed at Doha their commitment to the principle of IPRs 
protection as the driving force behind innovation by recognizing that “intellectual property protection is 
important for the development of new medicines” (Article 2 of the Doha ministerial declaration).  
Then, the principle following which IPRs protection was subordinate to the principle of public health 
was reiterated: “We agree that the TRIPs agreement does not and should not prevent members from 
taking measures to protect public health”, (….), “Accordingly, we affirm that the Agreement can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect 
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all”. (Doha Ministerial Declaration, 
paragraph 4). Thus, the possibility for members to recourse to PI and CL in case of national 
emergencies, and the sole discretion to define what “constitutes a national emergency” was strongly 
reaffirmed (Paragraphs 5b and 5c). On the one hand, members are free to establish their own 
exhaustion principle for IPRs (Paragraph 5d) and to settle the scope of the practical resort to PI. 
However, on the other hand, faced with the objections raised by African countries, which were unable 
to grant CL due to insufficient or null manufacturing capabilities in their territory, the ministerial WTO 
conference held at Doha instructed members to find a solution before the end of 2002 (Paragraph 6).  
In August 2003, a few months before the Cancun summit, an agreement was reached. An additional 
flexibility was introduced: the possibility for members to import medicines under CL. Thus, a country 
like Tanzania can issue a CL and ask a firm established in a third country to manufacture the drugs 
and export them to its territory enabling it to deal with a national emergency. Strict conditions were set 
out: a predetermined production volume, unequivocal identification of products, notification of these 
conditions and the country of consignment as well as adequate remuneration to the patent owner as 
provided by the TRIPs agreement (in Article 31h).  
Yet, the issue of innovation dissemination in the world and especially technology transfers to 
developing countries is still questionable. Possibly, the implementation of a global minimum legislative 
framework for the protection of IPRs ensures on one side firms to recover the resources invested in 
the development of new medicines (Arrow, 1962, Demsetz, 1967, Grabowsky, 1982, Mansfield, 1986, 
Levin & al., 1987, Scherer, 1998, Cohen & al., 2000, Crampes, 2000). As a consequence, a strong 
IPRs regime is considered to uphold innovation and favour the rising of social welfare through the 
supply of new drugs (Cutler & MacClellan, 2001, Grabowski, 2002, Lichtenberg, 2002, NIHCM, 2002). 
On the other side, technology transfers may be promoted and provide developing countries with new 
technical and therapeutic innovations (Mansfield, 1994, Saggi, 2000, Correa, 2001, Lall, 2003, 
Maskus, 2004, Correa, 2005, Maskus & Reichman, 2005, Gallagher, 2005).  
However, compared to practical tools implemented to protect the rights of patents holders, in the field 
of technology transfer intentions are governing. Article 66-2 of the TRIPs agreement notes that 
“developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories 
for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country 
Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base”. Besides, the 
paragraph 37 of the Doha Declaration agrees “to an examination, in a Working Group under the 
auspices of the General Council, of the relationship between trade and transfer of technology, and of 
any possible recommendations on steps that might be taken within the mandate of the WTO to 
increase flows of technology to developing countries”. With the forbidden of any working patent 
provision, there is virtually no tool that may foster the dissemination of innovation and the transfer of 
technology towards developing countries.  
While animated debates govern the progressive implementation of TRIPs agreements in developing 
countries and high concerns are expressed about the way those countries should amend their law in a 
way that favours the full use of flexibilities provided by the agreement, attention is more and more 
focusing on the distinct path followed by the USA. For the past five years, far from the logic of 
“multilateralism” followed by the WTO, numbers of USA FTAs are being signed with the perspective to 
undermine severely the capability of developing countries to benefit from TRIPs flexibilities, and so 
promote public health and access to medicines.  
3. Free trade agreements: drugs accessibility under  higher standards  
Definitely, TRIPs agreement results for developing countries in significant loss of policy regarding drug 
accessibility. Before the ratification of this agreement, patents were not granted for product in most of 
developing countries. Cheaper generic drugs could be manufactured in those countries. However, 
flexibilities exist: to ensure drug accessibility whenever national emergency or anticompetitive 
practices arise, developing countries can issue a CL or permit IP. Beyond the vivid discussions about 
the impact of TRIPs agreement on socio-economic development and especially access to medicines 
in developing countries, numbers of bilateral and regional FTAs between USA and other developing 
countries are expanding. Their content drive commentators and analysts from different fields to qualify 
them as “TRIPs plus” agreements; the IPRs regime implemented under the aegis of the WTO is 
notably strengthened in FTAs.  
3.1. Bilateral and regional USA Free Trade Agreemen ts  
For the past five years, numerous FTAs were signed and others are about to be signed between 
developed and developing countries. In particular, USA has negotiated and is currently negotiating 
bilateral and regional agreements with developing countries. A bilateral agreement was settled with 
Jordan in 2000. Two other bilateral agreements were signed in 2003 with Singapore and Chile. Then 
Australia, Bahrain and Morocco reached a bilateral agreement with USA in 2004. During 2006, 
bilateral agreements were signed with Oman, Colombia and Peru. Other bilateral agreements are 
under discussion with Panama, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia or Korea as recall the 
demonstration organised here and then by the civil society or the comments made by public 
authorities to complain on the content and the impact of such agreements.  
Also, regional agreements have been settled. Since the trade agreement signed between Mexico, 
Canada and USA in 1993 (refereed to as the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA), other 
regional agreements were negotiated or are presently negotiated. Especially, the US-Central America 
FTA (CAFTA) was reached in December 2003. The agreement involved the US, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. In parallel, the USA separately negotiated a bilateral 
agreement with the Dominican Republic, with a view to folding the deal, and the country itself, into the 
US-CAFTA scheme.  
Others regional agreements are under discussion. Since 2003, a FTA between US and the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU), composed of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and 
Swaziland, is negotiated4. Besides, negotiations have been launched since 2004 to reach a regional 
FTA with the Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. Since then, five rounds of 
negotiations have taken place with Colombia, Peru and Ecuador. And ongoing negotiations between 
the USA and the United Arab Emirates will serve to promote a regional FTA, the Middle East Free 
Trade Area (MEFTA) initiative to “advance economic reforms and promote trade among countries in 
the Middle East and the Persian Golf” as ensured invariably USA trade representatives. For the 
moment, USA is expanding deepening economic ties through Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreements (TIFAs), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), and comprehensive FTAs with countries like 
Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Yemen.  
To sum up, USA is leading at the same time negotiations with developing countries through bilateral 
and regional FTAs with the purpose of implementing FTAs on the largest geographical scheme. 
Accordingly, the bilateral and the close regional agreements signed or negotiated between USA and 
countries from Latin America should help to implement in the future the larger Free Trade Area of the 
Americas. In the same vein, in order to uphold a regional agreement with the Association of South-
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), US are expanding the number of FTAs signed and actually negotiated 
with members of the association. The ten-members of the ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) represent collectively the 
fifth largest trading partner of the USA. In order to achieve this large regional agreement, the USA 
intends hence to develop a network of bilateral FTAs with ASEAN countries.  
In other words, every time, negotiations within a regional agreement become difficult, bilateral links 
with one or more partners of the regional FTA are activated in order to build various bilateral 
agreements that may be folded into a larger agreement. And more and more developing countries are 
                                                
4 Founded in 1969 and based on custom union arrangements, the SACU aims to promote economic development for he 
Southern Africa area. Since 1994, SACU's trade with the US has grown more than 300 percent. It exports t  the US 
amounted to US$ 1.7 billion and imports to US$ 2.5 billion in 2002.  
signing trade agreements with USA on a bilateral basis and/or a regional basis; the list given above is 
not exhaustive.  
3.2. Objective and purposes of FTA 
Every FTA contains a chapter on IPRs5. This chapter does not clearly spell out the objectives and 
purposes of these agreements. Precisely, TRIPs agreement and the Doha ministerial decision put 
forward the appropriate balance to find between the protection of IPRs, the promotion of innovation 
and the transfer and dissemination of technology on one side and the promotion of socio-economic 
welfare on the other side (Musungu & Oh, 2006). In contrast, the FTAs do not spell out such 
objectives and unsurprisingly provisions are viewed as serious ways to undermine the full use of 
flexibilities provided by the TRIPs agreement regarding drug accessibility in developing countries. The 
practical resort to those flexibilities may ease the supply of generic drugs at lower prices and favour 
accessibility through affordability and availability.  
On this point, developing countries seems to consider that a net gain can be obtained in exchange for 
concessions about IPRs. Larger market access in developed countries by way of reduction in import 
taxes should give bigger earnings on agriculture products (and other sectors) and increase gross 
domestic production and gross national income per capita. At the end, people should be able to afford 
higher cost medicines6.  
In some bilateral or regional agreements (CAFTA-DR-USA FTA, Chile-USA FTA for instance), initial 
provisions are set-up and objectives are then defined. “The objectives of this Agreement, as 
elaborated more specifically through its principles and rules, including national treatment, most-
favored-nation treatment and transparency, are to:  
a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and 
services between the territories of the Parties;  
b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area;  
c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties;  
d) provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in 
each Party's territory;  
e) create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this Agreement, for its 
joint administration and for the resolution of disputes; and  
f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation to expand 
and enhance the benefits of this Agreement”.  
Thus, any reference to the protection of IPRs in a way consistent with the economic and social welfare 
of population by mean of public health protection for instance is missing. FTAs focus on the promotion 
of trade and stress mostly on the need to remove barriers to trade and set-up an effective protection of 
IPRs. This point relies in the peremptory position adopted towards IPR, implicitly or explicitly as in the 
Chile-USA FTA where “the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights is a fundamental 
principle of this chapter that helps promote technological innovation as well as the transfer of and 
dissemination of technology to the mutual advantage of technology producers and users, and that 
encourages the development of social and economic well-being” (Chapter 17, preamble). While 
researchers still question the effect of IPRs on industrial development and socio-economic welfare in 
southern countries (Maskus & Reichman, 2005, Gallagher, 2005), the protection of IPRs as an 
efficient mean to promote trade and sustainable development is postulated in USA FTAs.  
At the end, considering the fact that the USA FTAs neglect substantially to spell out objectives and 
principles, it becomes thus difficult for Party to interpret the content of this agreement in the light of 
public health promotion. On the contrary, as settled in the TRIPs agreement and reaffirmed in the 
Doha ministerial decision, members must interpret the provisions and the protection of IPRs in regards 
of the public health promotion.  
                                                
5 The starting point of these FTAs is the “special 301” which lists the countries where legislation, policy or practices damage 
USA economic interests. On the basis of the “Priority watch list”, countries are subject to USA commercial pressure. Finally, 
this mechanism leads to the conclusion of FTAs betwe n USA and developing countries during the 2000s.  
6 Still, the subsidies issue is neglected in this debat : USA keeps on subsidising among others domestic producers of cotton 
giving rise to disputes within the WTO. Even the benefits expected in agriculture may be thus over-estimated.  
In addition, alike the Morocco-USA FTA, some agreements state that parties can implement “a more 
extensive protection and enforcement”, i.e. a more stringent IPRs regime than the one required by a 
bilateral or a regional FTA: “A party may provide more extensive protection for, and enforcement, of 
intellectual property rights under its law than this chapter requires, provided that the additional 
protection and enforcement is not inconsistent with this chapter”. As TRIPs agreement, FTAs provide 
minimum standards for the protection and enforcement of IPRs and Parties are free to implement 
more constraining provisions. In fact, these minimum standards give rise to higher standards 
compared to those required by the TRIPs agreement.  
3.3. The Provisions incriminated 
In bilateral and regional FTAs, some provisions may be considered as serious threats to the ability of 
developing countries to fully resort to the flexibilities provided by the TRIPs agreement. These 
flexibilities concern chiefly the patentability criteria, the protection of clinical data, CL and PI. Here, 
large references will be made to the CAFTA-DR-USA FTA and the Morocco-USA FTA, the latter being 
defined as the higher level of IPRs protection ever obtained by USA within a FTA. Several provisions 
are devoted to the extension of market exclusivity for a firm and to the prevention of generic 
competition by means of patent and data protection.  
Following the TRIPs agreement, the Morocco-USA FTA admits the need for non-patentability 
criteria . In order to “protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal, or plant life or 
health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment” (Article 15-9, paragraph 1), party may exclude 
some inventions from patentability. But where the TRIPs agreement indicates what members “may 
prevent” from patentability (Article 27), the Morocco-USA FTA prescribes that parties “may only” 
exclude from patentability inventions on the basis of the criteria given above. In other words, non-
patentability criteria are narrowed in the Morocco-USA FTA, and may be so in other FTAs; other 
circumstances than the one defined above cannot be put forward to forbid the grant of a patent.  
On the other side, going beyond the prescription of the TRIPs agreement, FTAs intend this time to 
favour a broad interpretation of the patentability criteria . As stated in the TRIPs agreement and the 
Morocco-USA FTA, patents shall be available for any inventions, in any field for product and process. 
Yet, the definition of an invention is enlarged to include “any new uses or methods of using a known 
product, including new uses of a known product for the treatment of humans and animals” (Article 15-
9, paragraph 2). As a consequence, if a firm is granted a patent for the development of a drug, 
precisely for one medical indication, it can obtain a second patent for a new medical indication and so 
on. This article enables so firms to extend the scope of protection attached to a product by simply 
declaring new medical indications. Extending the scope of patent may contribute to the evergreening 
of patent in developing countries. Even though the product is not really new, it can be granted 
numerous patents for successive incremental innovations. This delay again and again the launch of 
generic medicines and keep prices high out of reach for public health authorities, Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) and patients in developing countries.  
On this point, the Morocco-USA FTA fixes that a new product is “one that contains a new chemical 
entity that has not been previously approved in the Party’s territory ” (article 15-10, paragraph 1). So, 
if a medicine is not very new in the world for the reason that it was developed and patent for instance 
in USA in 1999, for lack of patent application in Morocco till today, this product will be considered as a 
new one and be proper for patentability. There is no regulatory delay commending a firm to patent its 
product in a country “A” and then patent it in country “B” within a certain time.  
All put together, these provisions offers large opportunities to obtain patent for product and delay 
accordingly the launch of less expensive generic drugs in developing countries as competition is 
hindered. More debatable, even for drugs developed and patent before 1995 and not patentable under 
the TRIPs prescriptions, a firm may obtain a patent in developing countries because: (1) the firm did 
not ask for a patent in this country and asserts so that its drug is new under FTAs’ considerations; or 
(2) the firm claims for a new use of its drugs under FTAs provisions. At the end, the complexity and 
the confusion arising from TRIPs agreement and FTAs may be such that a firm may be basically able 
to ask for a patent and devote resources to defend its point of view in court, during a dispute 
settlement for instance. Adversely, generic makers may not have the resources and time necessary to 
challenge and invalidate patent claims.  
Finally, where a limited interpretation of the patentability criteria may ease the prevention of 
evergreening strategy and favour the launch of more affordable generic drugs in developing countries, 
the Morocco-USA FTA reveals the willing of USA to promote a broader interpretation of such criteria 
and enlarge the scope of patent. This aim is perfectly consistent with the objectives of multinationals in 
the pharmaceutical sector: gaining new and successive patents for the same chemical entity, 
prolonging their market exclusivity and at last delaying the launch of competitive generic drugs in 
developing countries with ultimately a negative impact on accessibility.  
The effective patent duration  may be undeniably reduced due to regulatory requirements: the review 
of clinical data takes time and reduces accordingly the effective exploitation of a patent. This evidence 
gives rise in the 80s to an extension of the patent duration in USA under the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
in other developed countries as stated before. For developing countries, the CAFTA-USA FTAs 
provided for instance that “a Party shall adjust the term of a patent to compensate for unreasonable 
delay that occurs in granting the patent. An unreasonable delay is “more than five years from the date 
of filing of the application in the territory of the Party, or three years after a request for examination of 
the application has been made” (Article 15-9, paragraph 6a). Thus, the restoration of the patent term 
may defer the date of patent expiration, so delay the entry of generic competitors on the market and 
finally postpone the supply of more affordable medicines due to the market exclusivity provided by the 
patent. Beyond patent, protection of data may also help firms to build and extend market exclusivity at 
the expense of generic competitors and mostly patients.  
When a firm wants to launch a medicine on the market, it must submit clinical data that ensure the 
quality, safety and efficacy of the medicine to a drug agency. If so, the firm gets marketing approval. 
Part of the drug development process, clinical data are costly investments for firms: clinical trials 
enrolling hundreds, even thousands of patients are organised to evaluate the quality, safety and 
efficacy of a drug. For generic makers, such investments are not required. They only have to assert 
the bioequivalence of the drug they submit and can rely on the clinical data previously produced7. 
Thus, saving resources on clinical trials, generic makers market their products at lower price.  
Concerning the disclosure of clinical data , through FTAs, USA works on two directions: protecting 
as long as possible those data from utilisation by third parties (generic makers) and limited as far as 
possible the data submitted by applicants. First, whereas the TRIPs agreement only recommends the 
protection of such data from “unfair commercial use” (Article 39-3), the FTAs simply prescribe their 
protection for at least 5 years. Precisely, “If a Party requires, as a condition of approving the marketing 
of a new pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical product, the submission of (a) safety and efficacy 
data or (b) evidence of prior approval of product in another territory that requires such information, the 
Party shall not permit third persons not having the consent of the person providing the information to 
market a product on the basis of the approval granted to the person submitting that information for at 
least five years for pharmaceutical and ten years for agricultural chemical products from the date 
of approval in the Party’s territory ” (Article 15-10, paragraph 1a). Thus, generic makers who would 
like to launch a copy of a drug in a country “A” will not be able to use the clinical data initially 
submitted. They will have to wait for the end of the data exclusivity period in country “A” or they will 
have to proceed to new clinical trials and produce their own clinical data. In the latter case, additional 
costs will be generated and higher prices will be charged to patients. More debatable, the principle of 
new clinical trials for medicines already approved and used in another country raises ethical 
considerations (Abbott, 2006)8. At the end, the protection of data grants market exclusivity to the firm 
which initially submits the clinical data and may delay the entry of more affordable generic drugs in 
developing countries9.  
Further, in the CAFTA-DR-USA FTA, another provision states that “If a party permits, as a condition of 
approving the marketing of a new pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical product, third persons to 
submit evidence concerning the safety and efficacy of a product that was previously approved in 
another country, such as evidence of prior marketing approval, the Party shall not permit third 
persons, without the consent of the person who previously obtained such approval in the other 
territory, to obtain authorization or to market a product on the basis of (1) evidence of prior marketing 
approval in another territory or (2) information concerning safety and efficacy that was previously 
submitted to obtain marketing approval in another territory for a least five years for pharmaceutical 
products and ten years for agricultural chemical products from the date approval was granted in 
the Party to the person who received authorization in the other territory ” (Article 15-10, 
paragraph 1b). Additionally, the trade agreement lays down that “a party may require that the person 
                                                
7 The drug must have the same chemical activity within t e body compared to the original drug.  
8 NGOs complain about the non-ethical dimension of this provision. During the clinical trials, numbers of patients infected 
for instance by HIV/AIDS may be prescribed a placebo while the quality, efficiency and safety of an ARV have been already 
checked in a developed country during previous clinical trials.  
9 During the Uruguay round, some developed countries plaid for the protection of data and failed to obtain it. Finally, through 
FTAs, USA succeeds in implementing provisions favourable to data protection and market exclusivity.  
providing the information in the other territory seek approval in the Party within five years after 
obtaining marketing approval in the other territory” (Article 15-10, paragraph b). Thus, a firm will adopt 
the following strategy: it will not ask for data exclusivity in the country “A” for the reason that its data 
exclusivity and so its market exclusivity are already ensured by data protection in country “B”. Five 
years later, the firm will then ask for data protection in country “A” as allowed legally and five–years of 
data protection will be granted in country “A”.  
All put together these provisions may grant data protection and market exclusivity to a firm for ten 
years in country “A”. Or to put it differently, ten years may go by before generic makers will be allowed 
to use clinical data and launch a copy of a medicine at low cost. More problematic, situations may 
arise where a medicine goes off-patent but market exclusivity is still granted since data protection is 
not over in country “A” (Abbott, 2006).  
Beside, the Morocco-USA FTA sets up that new clinical information will be protected for “at least three 
years from the date of approval in the Party” (Article 15-10, paragraph 2b). This requirement may help 
firms to extend again and again the protection of clinical data, for new uses of a product for instance, 
and obtain longer market exclusivity thanks to incremental developments made around the product.  
Concerning the disclosure of information related to an invention, efforts are made to reduce as much 
as possible the information disclosed. The Morocco-USA FTA prescribes that “each Party shall 
provide that the disclosure of a claimed invention shall be considered to be sufficiently clear and 
complete if it provides information that allows the invention to be made and used by a person skilled in 
the art, without undue experimentation, as of the filing date” (Article 15-9, paragraph 10). Following the 
seminal paper of Arrow (1962), IPRs were justified by the need to promote innovation and social 
welfare. As information was defined as a public good, under-investments in innovation were likely to 
occur threatening at the end social welfare. Later, Hatch-Waxman Act extended patent term in 
exchange for a timely entry of generic drugs as soon as patents expired; the condition being a large 
disclosure of information necessary to ensure a large diffusion of innovation and accessibility to it, 
especially among generic makers ready to launch copies of medicines that are about to go off-patents. 
Beyond these social considerations, the non-disclosure of information represents a significant issue 
and a crucial way, among others, to preclude generic competition by ensuring a limited access to 
information about chemical entities. And due to limited resources devoted to review the application for 
patents and marketing approvals in developing countries, regulatory authorities may have difficulties to 
evaluate the sufficiency and the clearness of the information submitted. In fact, they may be inclined to 
rely on the patent or the marketing approval granted in developed countries instead of proceeding to a 
review of the data submitted.  
As discussed above, developing countries may resort to PI to deal with a national emergency or an 
anticompetitive practice (prohibitive price or insufficient supply of the domestic market for instance). 
This possibility is related to the exhaustion  principle that prevails. The Morocco-USA FTA suggests 
that efforts will be made through bilateral and regional agreements to impose a restrictive exhaustion 
principle, which rejects PI. Therefore, a national or a regional exhaustion regime may respectively be 
implemented whenever possible in a bilateral or a regional agreement. The Morocco-USA FTA lays 
down that “each party shall provide that the exclusive right of the patent owner to prevent importation 
of a patented product, or a product that results from patented process, without the consent of the 
patent owner shall not be limited by the sale or distribution of  that product outside its territory ” 
(article 15-9, paragraph 4). Accordingly, as a national exhaustion principle is adopted and nothing in 
the TRIPs agreement forbids such provision, Morocco has actually renounced to a legitimate 
capability to import cheaper drugs from foreigner countries in order to deal with an emergency or an 
anticompetitive practice. At the end, population may suffer from prohibitive prices.  
Regarding the ability for developing countries to issue a CL for the same motives, the complexity and 
the uncertainty created by the provisions implemented in FTAs may seriously undermine the practical 
resort to CL. In the Morocco-USA FTA, “party shall implement measures in its marketing approval 
process to prevent such other persons from marketing a product covered by a patent during the term 
of that patent , unless by consent or with the acquiescence of the patent owner” (Article 15-10, 
paragraph 4a). On one side, TRIPs flexibilities provide that patents can be override and a CL issued in 
circumstances of national emergency for example. On the other side, FTAs may prevent the marketing 
approval of drugs, even under a CL: “the party shall implement measures in its marketing approval 
process to prevent such other persons from marketing a product covered by a patent claiming the 
previously approved product or its approved used during the term of that patent , unless consent or 
acquiescence of the patent owner” (Article 15;10, paragraph 2b, CAFTA-USA FTA). In other words, 
the patent term and so the protection of market exclusivity may prevail, even in particular 
circumstances. Further, since the objectives and the principles of FTAs remain unclear and references 
to flexibilities, exceptions or safeguards are basically missing, a public health sensitive interpretation of 
FTAs is thus hardly bearable. At the end, these conflicting provisions may bring about endless 
discussions and disputes in WTO and national courts about the provision to be adopted. As a result, 
generic entry may be deferred and more affordable drugs impeded.  
At the end, many provisions in FTAs may severely undermine the recourse to TRIPs flexibilities, 
obstruct the practical supply of generic drugs and ultimately damage drugs accessibility. As means to 
grant market exclusivity, patent and data protection may preserve monopolistic positions, defer 
competition and alter drug accessibility in developing countries. Nevertheless, numbers of bilateral or 
regional FTAs are already signed or under negotiations. Still, no one shall neglect the way provisions 
under TRIPs agreement may damage drug accessibility in developing countries.  
4. Competition and drug accessibility in developing  countries: some Indian and Thai evidence  
At this point of analysis, precisions have been made about international agreements, their potential 
promises and threats. Concerning the promises, under TRIPs agreement, flexibilities provided aim at 
enabling developing countries to promote public health and drug accessibility. Adversely, some “open” 
provisions may be used to extend market exclusivity and defer the launch of generic drugs. Similarly, 
under bilateral or regional FTAs, some provisions constitute serious impediments to competition and 
drug accessibility through the promotion of market exclusivity in developing countries. Going beyond 
factual elements, evidence from India or Thailand will be here exposed to state how international 
arrangements dealing with trade and IPRs lessen in practice drug accessibility in southern countries. 
But first let see the institutional factors that may support drug accessibility.  
4.1. The global effect of a favourable Indian IPRs regime on the price of anti-AIDS drugs  
ARVs production started in India in 1991. At that time, Cipla wisely started the manufacturing of the 
less costly ARVs, whose active substance content was low and manufacturing process was less 
complex. A decade later, five Indian companies (Cipla, Ranbaxy, Hetero, Aurodindo and Cadila) were 
involved in the ARVs production and more than a fifteen ARVs, including bi-therapies and tri-
therapies, were marketed in the world (Guennif, 2004).  
The entry of these actors on the market brought the cost of treatment crashing down. For example, the 
price of a therapy, combining three ARVs recommended by the WHO as a first-line regimen for naive 
patient in developing countries, decreased drastically. The sharp decline started with Cipla 
announcement in February 2001 that it would sell its triple therapy in the form of a cocktail at $350 per 
year per patient to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (MSF, 2005)10. At that time, a tri-therapy 
cost 931 USD per year and per patient with princeps. From March 2001, the price of tri-therapy with 
princeps fell to 727 USD. Moreover, competition between Indian generic makers triggered a new 
decline in prices. Two months after Cipla’s announcement, Hetero joined the competition and declared 
its intention to sell a cocktail at 347 USD to NGOs. Few months later, Ranbaxy raised the stakes by 
fixing the price of its cocktail at 295 USD for NGOs. In a recent report, MSF (2008) stated that prices 
were still decreasing. In 2003, Hetero was selling its tri-therapy at 152 USD per patient per year 
against 562 USD with princeps. In 2008, the same firm was supplying the treatment at 87 USD per 
patient and per year while the princeps combinaison is sold at 331 USD. Thus, “generic competition 
has shown to be the most effective means of lowering medicines price” (MSF, 2005).  
 
                                                
10 A cocktail is a treatment made of three ARVs that are present in a single pill to be taken 2 or 3 times a day. This so-called 
fixed-dose combination brings down the number of pills to be taken every day, improves significantly patient compliance and 
helps to prevent resistance (WHO, 2003).  
The effects of generic competition 
 
Source: MSF, 2008.  
The fall in price of first-line therapy made of three antiretrovirals: Stavudine, Lamivudine and Nevirapine.  
As stated in a previous work (Guennif, 2004), the core of this powerful competitive environment 
favourable to price reduction and drug accessibility improvement, relies in a consistent IPRs regime. In 
1970, India relaxed its IPRs regime. Before this date, under a strong IPRs regime, patents were 
granted for both process and product in the pharmaceutical sector. As a result, the domestic 
pharmaceutical industry was nascent and India was heavily dependant on external supplies of 
medicines marketed at prohibitive prices (Mittal, 1993, Keayla, 1995, Watal, 2001, Ramana, 2002, 
Lalitha, 2002).  
After 1970, India relaxed its IPRs regime mainly by providing patents only for process, by introducing a 
working patent provision and by setting a drug price control order. Within two decades, the results of 
this new institutional arrangement were conclusive: a fragmented domestic pharmaceutical industry 
made largely of thousand small units arose, the production of raw material and formulation drastically 
increased. Exports in the sector were such that the balance of trade was positive at the end of the 80s. 
Thus self-sufficiency was achieved and prices fell down. In conclusion, by making its IPRs regime 
more flexible, India encouraged the growth of a pharmaceutical industry and improved accessibility to 
drugs. And later, this high-performance industry succeeded in pushing ARVs prices down and 
improving accessibility in developing countries hit by HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
Yet, as a WTO member, since 2005 India is step by step amending its patent law to make it TRIPs 
compliance. At this point, one may legitimately wonder how a new IPRs system, which basically 
means a new reinforcement of the Indian patent law, would improve drug accessibility (and support 
the future course of the Indian pharmaceutical industry). In particular, WHO has changed lately its 
recommendations concerning anti-AIDS treatments in its 2006 report. From now on, medicines like 
Emtricitabine (FTC) and Tenofovir (TDF) are part of the first-line regimens recommended by the WHO. 
FTC and TDF were both patented after 1995 and patents will expired respectively in 2015 and 2018. 
As medicines patented after 1995 in a WTO member’s territory, these medicines are patentable in 
developing countries provided that the transitional period enables it. In India, the transitional period 
expired in 2005, so firms can apply for a patent. If a patent is granted, Indian manufactures will be 
unable to produce copies at low cost and supply public health authorities, NGOs and patients in their 
own territory and in developing countries. The stakes are hug since these drugs are part of fixed-dose 
combinations that enhances patients’ observance and reduce resistance. Thus, FTC and TDF may not 
only be unaffordable in India and other developing countries, but most of all fixed-dose combinations 
made of one or both medicines will be out of reach for patients in the South.  
Nevertheless, the Indian patent law opts for a limitation of patent scope by restraining the patentability 
criteria. New uses of a previously known drug are not patentable in India. Additionally, the Indian 
patent law provides for a pre-grant opposition: people can oppose a patent application filed by a firm. 
Due to these two provisions, for instance Gleevec, a medicine used to treat leukaemia and marketed 
by Novartis, was denied a patent in 2005. The Patent Controllers state that Gleevec was not a new 
drug but a new use of a previously known drug. Presently, Novartis is challenging the decision. 
Similarly, numbers of NGOs oppose the patent application filed by the firm Gilead on TDF on the 
same ground. Doing so, NGOs are willing to prevent impediments to access to this essential drug. 
Earlier, an opposition was made to GlaxoSmithKline’s patent application on Combivir, an anti-AIDS bi-
therapy. Since then, Gilead announced it was negotiating voluntary licenses with Indian manufacturers 
to make TDF within the next year … after obtaining a patent in India.  
At the end, not involved in any US FTAs and aware of its obligation as member of the WTO to amend 
its patent law in a way consistent with TRIPs agreement, India is showing a strong political will. It is 
currently exploring any flexibility provided by the TRIPs agreement to promote public health and drug 
accessibility. Here the preservation of competition and the presence of a powerful domestic industry 
should not be underestimated, factors that may be seriously undermined by missing or open 
provisions found in TRIPs agreement and/or stringent provisions elected in USA FTAs.  
4.2. Thailand experience: socio-economic developmen t under strong IPRs regime  
In the 90s, due to international pressure and TRIPs agreement, Thailand implemented a strong IPRs 
regime whose impacts are still questionable (Guennif & Mfuka, 2003). Whereas technology transfers 
remains diffuse till now, the negative effects on accessibility and availability of medicines are readily 
perceptible.  
Between 1979 and 1992, a period in which patents were only granted for process in Thailand, a 
generic version reached the market 1 to 2 years after the marketing of princeps. Following the 
modifications of its IPRs regime in 1992 and henceforth the granting of patent for both process and 
product for 20 years in the pharmaceutical sector, generic versions of patented products were 
available at least 5 years after the filing of the patent application, and 5 to 6 years later when this 
concerns a product under the Safety monitoring program (SMP) (Kwa, 2001)11.  
Furthermore, Thailand experienced the greatest difficulties in ensuring the supply of medicines at 
affordable prices. “The ddI affair” illustrates perfectly these difficulties. The Government 
Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) is a Thai public unit, which manufactures the drugs supplied to 
public hospitals. It managed to develop a generic version of the anti-AIDS treatment ddI whose patent 
dates back to 1987 and which was marketing by the American firm, Bristol-Myers & Squibb (BMS) at 
prohibitive price. In 1992, the year when the new TPA came into force, BMS patented an improved 
formulation of ddI and asked for market exclusivity, by demanding that the product be placed under 
SMP12. It obtained a temporary monopoly and sold the drug at $2,5 per tablet in a country where the 
daily minimum wage averaged $3.84. GPO had to stop its manufacturing programme aimed at 
supplying a generic version at lower price. Thus, the ARV remained unaffordable for most patients 
living with HIV/AIDS (Guennif & Mfuka, 2003).  
Far from abandoning, in 1997, GPO filed a request for a CL, provided by the 1992 Thai Patent Act 
(and later by the TRIPs agreement). Under USA pressure13, the government gave up and put an end 
to the procedure for the issue of a CL. GPO had to produce a new ddl formulation (ddl) in powder 
form, so as not to infringe the patent obtained at that moment by BMS for its improved formulation. 
Since then, AIDS activists sued BMS in 2001 and asked for the revocation of the patent for lack of 
“significant inventive steps or novelty” so that GPO could produce tablets, more convenient for 
patients and less expensive (cf. table below). Since then, BMS patent was not invalided but its scope 
reduced so that GPO could produce tablet larger than 100mg dosage form (Oxfam, 2004). The 
generic was marketed at half price of the original drug. At the end, under the pressure of the civil 
society, BMS gave up its patent. But as indicated earlier, a US FTA is presently under discussion.  
                                                
11 The SMP was established in 1992 under USA pressure. It made it possible to grant “exclusive marketing rights” (EMR). 
Officially, the SMP aimed at improving the quality of newly marketed products. Unofficially, it allowed companies to get 
protection for products that had never been patented i  the country. It permits multinationals to obtain  temporary 3-year 
monopoly for products patented and marketed elsewhere b fore 1992. However, once it came within the purview of Special 
301, Thailand once again amended its TPA in 1993, extending the EMR to 5 years. Most of all, during theperiod where the 
Thai Food and Drug Administration was controlling drug quality, no generic version could be marketed.  
12 The modification of the formulation consisted simply in the addition of an antacid.  
13 Use of the “Special 301” once again.  
Comparison of princeps and generic prices in Thaila nd (in USD, 2001) 
Medicine Princeps price Generic price Decrease in % 
Fluconazole (200mg caps) 6.20 0.26 95,8 
Stavudine (40mg caps) 2.60 0.10 96 
Zidovudine (AZT) (100mg caps) 0,50 0.15 70 
Didanosine (ddI) (100mg tab/170mg powder) 1.20 0.62 48 
Source: Oxfam, 2001 and GPO, 2001. 
Considering public health issues, these facts permit legitimately to address the potential effects of the 
USA FTAs where patentability criteria are broaden, data protection introduced, PI forbidden and CL 
limited. Whereas exceptions to the patent holder’s rights are provided by the TRIPs agreement, like 
Thailand pressured by commercial threats or due to FTAs stringent provisions, which create moreover 
complexity and uncertainty, developing countries may be legally unable to resort to generic supply to 
reduce drastically medicine prices and may face practical difficulties when resorting to CL to sustain 
drug accessibility.  
5. Discussion 
Under TRIPs agreement, developing countries members of the WTO are required to implement a 
constraining IPRs regime where flexibilities are provided for the protection of public health and the 
support of drug accessibility. As partners further of FTAs, these countries are committed to more 
stringent IPRs regime and narrow flexibilities, devoted largely to the promotion of market exclusivity at 
the expense of competition and affordability.  
Following these considerations, developing countries have to show a strong political will to stand 
international pressure which is aimed at imposing them stringent agreements. For instance, to be able 
to follow the Indian example, they need to limit the scope of patent in order to resort to the useful 
effect of competition on price. More difficult, following the Brazilian example, who use the compulsory 
licence as a credible threat to cut the price of medicines, suppose the existence of pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capabilities in the territory. This requirement is all the more vivid when efforts are made 
to impede the resort to the possibility for developing countries to proceed to importation under a CL. 
All the regulatory requirements are such that the procedure is difficult to achieve in the end. Countries 
need to declare the national urgency, plan the quantity of medicine needed, ask the producer to label 
the drugs so as to prevent their parallel exports towards more lucrative markets.  
Besides, international organisations may be more involved in scrutinizing bilateral and regional 
agreements in order to ensure that those are not inconsistent with national constitutions (for instance 
the USA Constitution) or international settlements. Otherwise, the promotion of public health and drug 
accessibility may rely for most part on the strong involvement of the civil society as indicate examples 
in South-Africa, India or Thailand.  
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